Adrian Moore posts: The Detailed Concerns of the CA HSR Peer Review Group:

“Since the Peer Review Group report is curiously still not available on their website (but you can email them for a copy) I thought a summary of their analysis would be useful.  Here, concisely as I can, are the key points, with some commentary.
1. “[I]t is hard to seriously consider a multi-billion dollar Funding Plan that offers no position on whether [the first operating section should be from almost Bakersfield to almost San Jose, or from Fresno to almost LA].”
2. The first section to be built will not be “a very high-speed railway (VHSR)” capable of operating at top speeds.  “Therefore it does not appear to meet the requirements of the enabling State legislation.” “The [first section] will not be electrified, and thus cannot serve as a high-speed test track for the future VHSR rolling stock.”
3. “The only clear remaining basis for the [first section] is that it can serve as a vehicle for the use of Federal money that has specific deadlines.”
4. “The fact that the Funding Plan fails to identify any long term funding commitments is a fundamental flaw in the program.” “The CHSRA has also made it clear there will be no private sector interest in the project until the full public sector role is defined and funded, which means that significant private funding will not be available for many years.”  “The legislature could, of course, rectify this by enacting [a new tax or fee]. Lacking this, the project as it is currently planned is not financially ‘feasible’.”
5. “[W]e do not think that the current description constitutes a ‘feasible’ business model for a number of reasons.” (bullets paraphrase)
The draft business plan relies on ‘illustrative’ concepts not decisions by the CHSRA.
There is no identified funding for the plan presented.
The biggest risk is system integration, but the plan requires all integration to happen very late in the project.
6. “We have repeatedly said that we do not believe that the current approach to project management, with the CHSRA’s staffing, salaries and procurement controlled by California public agency rules, will suffice if the project gets fully underway and the CHSRA has to suddenly manage a construction effort larger than that currently managed by Caltrans.”(emphasis added)
7. “Unfortunately, despite a strong recommendation from this group, the demand forecasts remain an internal product of the CHSRA and its internal peer review panel. The forecasts have not been subjected to external and public review, and many of the internal workings of the model. . . remain unclear.”
8. “Capital cost estimates for the system have been steadily rising in every Business Plan.” “The reasonableness of the capital budgets would be improved by development of a risk-based, cost-loaded construction schedule that makes a more explicit attempt to allow for a broad range of outcomes in cost and schedule.”
9. “[T]he decision to put the entire initial effort into the Central Valley maximizes the risk to the State if no significant funding appears after the initial Federal contributions.”
10. “In our judgment, a finding of feasibility in the Funding Plan would require that the following assumptions be found reasonable:” (bullets paraphrase)
The first section can be completed within budget and on time despite a lack of construction experience, managerial resources, and potential delays from lawsuits.
The $24-$30 billion still needed to connect the first section to either San Jose or San Fernando valley when the state is the only likely source, and is broke.
That the cost once up and running will be on budget, ridership will be close to estimates, and an inexperienced CHSRA can manage all the tricky integration issues.
All these same things will be true of adding the next part of the system, including another $14-$35 billion.
“[O]ur experience with [other HSR projects in the US and around the world] strongly suggest that each of these assumptions alone is slightly optimistic, and taken together, strongly so.””